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arjun guneratne  MACALESTER COLLEGE
tHaru – state relations in nepal and india
When I arrived in Nepal in 1989 to carry out 
research among the Tharu, I paid a courtesy call on 
a high Nepali official close to the center of power. 
After we had chatted politely of this and that for a few 
minutes, he asked me about what I planned to do, 
and I replied I intended to carry out a research project 
about the Tharu. His reply was instructive; it was a 
dismissive “Oh, those Indians!” That throwaway 
remark encapsulates some of the problems of state-
building, national identity formation and democratic 
participation that characterizes Nepal today. That 
such attitudes and perceptions endure, despite 
a decade of “Peoples’ War” based in part on the 
recognition of ethnic rights, is suggested in the recent 
attempt (in 2009) by the late Maoist government 
of Nepal to classify the Tharu as Madhesi (a word 
dominant groups in Nepal have understood to mean 
an “Indian” inhabitant of the Tarai)—a move that led 
to the mobilization of Tharu throughout the Tarai in 
protest, and the loss of several lives.  
Although the Tarai has been central to the 
economic viability of the Nepali state since its 
inception, the people of that region have been 
politically marginalized and treated with suspicion by 
the hill-based elites who ruled the country. The Tharu 
are not Madhesi and the Madhesi are not Indian, and 
that remark indicates the limitations, and indeed the 
failure, of the policy of “national integration” favored 
by the panchayat regime to create a cohesive and 
distinctive cultural identity that could encompass all 
Nepalis. Where the Tharu are concerned, although 
they were essential to the state when the Tarai was 
malarial (both for their labor and for their role 
as revenue collectors), they became marginalized 
when malaria was controlled and it became possible 
for hill people to settle in the Tarai year round. 
That marginalization in turn led to a movement by 
Tharu elites (a social stratum originating in the large 
landlords and revenue collectors of former times) to 
develop a sense of ethnic self-hood in the context of 
a modernizing and centralizing state (see Guneratne 
2002). At the same time, a great many Tharu, 
especially in the Western Tarai, lost control of land to 
settlers from the hills, and were reduced to conditions 
of semi-serfdom. The movement to free these bonded 
labor (kamaiya) became one of the defining political 
struggles for western Tharu in the late twentieth and 
early twenty-first centuries, and coupled with the 
violence they endured at the hands of the state—
whose agents viewed all Tharu in the Western Tarai as 
Maoists during the Peoples’ War—radicalized them, 
reinforced their ethnic consciousness and enhanced 
their organizational skills, all of which were on 
display during the two Tharu andolan of 2009. 
The ethnic label Tharu is shared by well over a 
million people who live in the Tarai. According to 
the 2001 census, there were over 1.5 million Tharus 
in Nepal, while smaller populations live in adjacent 
areas of India. The Tharu consider themselves to be 
indigenous to the Tarai, predating both Madhesi and 
hill people as inhabitants of that region, and playing 
an essential if subordinate role in the emergence of the 
modern Nepali state. Although they share the same 
ethnonym, the people known as the Tharu belong to 
This paper examines the relationship of the Tharu, one of the more numerous of the ethnic groups that 
inhabit the Tarai, to the various states that encompassed them during the course of the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries. These include the British colonial state and its Indian successor, the Shah and Rana 
states of nineteenth and early twentieth century Nepal, and the modern Nepali state as it has developed since 
1951. The paper argues that the political ecology of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in the Tarai 
made the Tharu an indispensable part of state building for both the British and for Rana Nepal. The capacity 
of Tharu society to survive in often extreme malarial conditions made them an irreplaceable source of labor 
in the Tarai while the Tharu elite furnished the state with a necessary cadre of lower-level administrators. 
However, following on the economic and political transformations that took place in the post-1951 period, 
the Nepali state’s interest in the Tarai changed, both as a function of bureaucratic development that made 
the administrative role the Tharu had played largely irrelevant, as well as the emergence of the Tarai as a 
crucial site of national identity building. The consequent marginalization of the Tharu was an important 
factor shaping Tharu ethnic consciousness in the modern period.  
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cultural and political projects of the Nepali state. 
The central point with regard to Tharu-state relations 
is that in the period before the 1950s, the Tharus were 
essential to the successful accomplishment of state projects 
in the Tarai and in the post-1950s period, they were not. The 
Tharu were reputedly the only people who could survive 
in the malarial Tarai (although there was significant Indian 
immigration into some regions of the Tarai, especially in the 
east), and as such were an essential source of both labor and 
revenue administration. While the Tharu were essential to 
the successful exploitation of the Tarai in pre-modern times, 
the Tarai was essential to the economic well-being of the 
emerging Nepali state. It is perhaps even more important 
today. Before modern times, the revenues that hill states 
derived from the Tarai came from agriculture, timber (to feed 
the railways of British India), the capture and sale of elephants 
and pasturage of cattle. In all these activities, Tharus played 
important roles. They were first of all a source of labor in 
agriculture, although their numbers never proved adequate 
for this task. But local Tharu elites were also indispensable 
to the state as intermediaries between the state and the local 
societies that the state sought to control; they were revenue 
collectors, minor judicial officials and were entrusted with 
various administrative tasks. Many Tharus were active in the 
timber trade. Finally, Tharus dominated (and still do) work 
related to elephants. In the post 1950s period however, the 
Tharu ceased to play these roles, with the exception of their 
role in the elephant stables, where they still predominate. The 
bureaucratization of the revenue administration marginalized 
the Tharu even as it benefitted hill castes with closer ties to 
state power. Finally, the eradication of malaria resolved once 
and for all the Tarai’s perennial problem of labor. As I will 
discuss below, this transformation had its impact on the 
shaping of Tharu ethnic identity.
In what follows, I shall examine the relations that existed 
between Tharu societies and the states that encompassed 
them, focusing on the state policies that shaped Tharu identity 
in the modern period in India and Nepal.
THE THARU AND THE STATE IN INDIA
Judging by the disproportionate attention paid to them in 
the writings of colonial officials in the northern districts of the 
United Provinces, the British seem to have been particularly 
fascinated by the Tharu, whose diligence as cultivators was 
often used as a foil to make more disparaging observations 
about the peasantry settled in caste-based villages. Walter 
Hamilton, for instance, devotes a third of his account of 
Gorakhpur District to the Tharu, who formed only a minute 
part of its population (Hamilton 1820). W.W.Hunter noted 
approvingly, “They are first-rate cultivators . . . Those who 
have dealings with them say they are far more upright and 
honest than the ordinary Champaran rayat” (Hunter 1877: 
245). Nesfield spoke of them in the following terms: “The 
Thârus are, for the most part, a peaceful and good-natured 
race, following without question, as if by a law of nature, the 
a number of communities that vary greatly over the extent 
of the Tarai, in terms of the languages they speak and their 
cultural practices. The various Tharu languages are related to 
each other in much the same way that the Romance languages 
are; that is, they all belong to the great North Indian branch 
of the Indo-European language family. When Tharus from 
different areas gather, they usually turn to Hindi or Nepali 
to communicate. These languages are widely spoken by most 
Tarai people, Tharu and non-Tharu alike. Life for most Tharu 
has changed dramatically in the last 50 years because the Tarai 
has become the focus of the largest population shift in Nepal’s 
history, which has brought hill people in their hundreds of 
thousands to settle in Nepal’s fertile lowlands.  This process 
has been encouraged by the state as a way to consolidate its 
control over a region whose population was viewed with 
distrust.
I examine in this paper the relations of the various ethnic 
groups that share the ethnonym Tharu to the states that 
encompassed them during the past two centuries. As the 
hill polities evolved into the modern state of Nepal, defined 
by national boundaries, Weberian bureaucratization and 
centralized political control, there has been a sharpening 
and politicization of group identities that formerly had 
little or no political significance. As in many multi-ethnic 
states, national identity formation was based on the culture 
and practices of the ruling elites and their ethnic kin, and 
provided no space for the culture of subaltern populations, 
which were collectively in the majority. Nepal’s approach has 
been different from that pursued in India, which has dealt 
with its diversity by embracing it; Indian nationalism is not 
predicated on the language and culture of a single group but 
of loyalty to the state as the representative of all its people (cf. 
Roy 2007). In contrast, the ideology of national integration 
as it has been deployed in Nepal has essentially meant, to the 
country’s political elite, the organization of identity around 
the cultural symbol of the dominant classes. This is the 
process that Bista has called nepalization (which many Tarai 
activists prefer to call paharization). This concept of national 
integration emphasizes the cultural (narrowly conceived) at 
the expense of the political; what it does not do is to provide 
those historically marginal and subaltern groups an equal 
place at the table, nor does it provide space for their cultures in 
the envisioning of Nepali nationhood. Mishra has pointed out 
with respect to the Tarai, for example, the poor representation 
of Tarai people in positions of power nationally, and notes 
that their relatively low representation in parliament is due in 
part to the preference of national political parties to nominate 
hill immigrants to the Tarai for Tarai seats (Mishra 1992). It 
is also the case that parliamentary constituencies in the Tarai 
represent larger populations than do hill constituencies, 
thereby diluting even further the potential impact of the Tarai 
and its non-pahari population in national politics. This lack 
of integration into the administration of the state and to state 
patronage, as well as the pervasive discrimination encountered 
by both the Madeshi and the Tharu, has undermined both the 
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customs and maxims of their ancestors” (quoted in Crooke 
1896: 403), while Charles Williams described them in the 
Oudh Census report in 1869 as “courageous and good-
natured, peaceful and hardworking . . . mutually helping each 
other in cultivation and adjusting among themselves all the 
affairs of their little communities” (Williams 1869: 111). The 
generally positive characterization of the Tharu in the colonial 
accounts was doubtless reinforced by the British assumption 
that the Tharus were immune to malaria (although some 
officials disputed that; see for example Cavenagh 1851: 94) 
and thus the only people who could be depended on to 
provide labor in the Tarai districts of the Raj. By the same 
token, some British officials were reluctant to enforce policies 
that might drive the Tharu across the border into Nepal. For 
instance, the British gave the Tharu some latitude to distill 
their own liquor (a practice otherwise prohibited to the 
peasantry), subscribing to the belief, apparently promoted 
by the Tharu themselves, that liquor was essential for their 
survival in the unhealthy climate of the Tarai (Crooke 1896: 
405). The Tharu thus appear to have enjoyed a relatively 
privileged position—privileged, that is, relative to adjacent 
Indian ethnic groups—in those areas of the Tarai controlled 
by the British following the conclusion of the Anglo-Nepal 
War. 
The importance of the Tharu to the economy of the Tarai 
is particularly salient in the British accounts. The problem 
the British faced was that of finding adequate labor in their 
state forests in the Tarai, as well as to cultivate land in the 
Tarai districts, and the Tharu apparently furnished a reliable 
supply. An excellent example of this understanding and how 
it operated to the advantage of the Tharu comes from the 
Pilibhit district in 1851. The Board of Revenue was asked 
to rule on a claim by a local raja to an estate (the taluka of 
Namikmutta), which was occupied by a community of Tharu 
who had made a separate revenue settlement with a British 
official. The Board ruled against the raja, justifying their 
decision in the following terms:
The arrangement . . . was, in the opinion of 
the Board, likely to conduce to clearing and 
populating a part of the country which it had 
not only been found hitherto impossible to 
improve, but which had been in a state of 
continual deterioration, and as the people in 
question [i.e. the Tharu] . . . are described as 
. . . the only persons whose lives are safe in the 
climate had expressed the desire to undertake 
the cultivation of the Tract at their own risk . . 
. the Board were of opinion that they ought not 
to cramped in their undertaking by any official 
control.1
The British categorized the Tharu under a variety of 
1. The Governor-General in Council, Revenue Department, 13th August 
1851. India and Bengal Despatches, 6th – 27th August, 1851, Vol. 72. India 
Office Library, E/4/811.
different labels in the various censuses, from aboriginal tribe 
in the first countrywide census of 1872 to forest tribe in 
1891 and later, in 1921, to “hill and forest tribe” (Srinivasan 
and Ranjan 2003: 204-205).  There is of course no objective 
definition of “tribe”, and the British used different criteria at 
different times. In general, groups of people living beyond 
the control of caste-based states in ecologically remote areas 
were thought of as tribal. In the 1872 census, religion was 
used to distinguish aboriginal people from Hindus, while 
in the 1935 Government of India Act, religion, which had 
come in for a great deal of criticism from census officials as 
a useful criterion by which to distinguish between “tribal” 
and “Hindu” was abandoned in favor of ecological criteria 
(i.e., people living in “forests, hills and mountains” were 
considered backward tribes) (Srinivasan and Ranjan 2003: 
205). The Tharu however, did not receive the legal status of 
“tribe” in India in the immediate aftermath of independence, 
but had to struggle for many years to achieve it.
 From Backward Class to Scheduled Tribe
Where the Tharus of Bihar and Uttar Pradesh are 
concerned, despite their classification as “tribal” in colonial 
India, they did not immediately receive the status of Scheduled 
Tribe following independence.  It took a protracted struggle 
lasting half a century for the Tharu of Champaran (Bihar) 
to achieve reclassification as a Scheduled Tribe (see below). 
The Tharu in Uttar Pradesh, who were the largest of the five 
“tribes” of that state prior to the separation of Uttaranchal 
(Uttarakhand) (Maiti 2004: 26) did not achieve Scheduled 
Tribe status until 1967, because the first Chief Minister of 
the state, G.B.Pant, was opposed to the recognition of any 
tribes within the state “to avoid the politics of tribalism” 
(Srinivasan and Ranjan 2003: 219). Following the separation 
of Uttaranchal, the Tharu are the sole remaining Scheduled 
Tribe in U.P.  According to Srinivasan and Ranjan, the Tharu 
in U.P. were eventually granted Scheduled Tribe (ST) status 
because “their small numbers did not affect state politics in 
any significant way” (ibid). They add, “The privileges flowing 
from ST status as also the economic opportunities opened up 
by the aggressive cultivation of the western terai . . . helped 
U.P. Tharus achieve a much more ‘developed’ status than 
their Bihar brethren. For that very reason however, they have 
become assimilated in the mainstream and lost their singular 
identity” (ibid). 
The most salient aspect of the relation between Tharus 
and the state in post-independence India is that the various 
Tharu populations are now classified as Scheduled Tribes, 
which give them in principle access to certain privileges and 
benefits. These included reserved seats in the legislature, as 
well as reservations in government posts and in university 
admissions (Galanter 1984). This is, in effect, a policy of 
national integration, whose import is as much symbolic as 
it is material. While these benefits encouraged groups to 
hold on to their “tribal” identity (rather than, for instance, 
seek to assimilate to “caste” society through processes of 
tHaru-state relations/guneratne
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Champaran to achieve recognition as a Scheduled Tribe, 
which they accomplished on January 8, 2003 after a 50-year 
campaign. The following discussion is based on their paper 
(Srinivasan and Ranjan 2003). 
Although the Tharus of Champaran were given the status 
of a scheduled tribe in the census of 1941, they were not 
included in the Scheduled Tribes Order of 1950, which gave 
tribal people Scheduled status—and thus access to certain 
privileges and benefits— in independent India for the first 
time. Instead, in 1951, they were listed as a Backward Class, 
a status that, in effect, placed them in the lower rungs of the 
local caste hierarchy. This move was resisted by the Tharu, 
who had been claiming Ksatriya status since the 1940s, but to 
no avail; according to Srinivasan and Ranjan, “Their economic 
deprivation worked against them and they could not achieve 
their goal” (2003: 211). In fact, in 1955 the first Backward 
Classes Commission had also recommended that they be listed 
as a Scheduled Tribe, and the Tharu in Uttar Pradesh had 
enjoyed that status since 1967. The Champaran Tharu used 
both these facts to argue for a change in their official status. 
The Bihar state government, however, was reluctant to list the 
Tharu in the Schedule because of the high concentration of 
tribal people in southern Bihar (which separated from the rest 
of Bihar in 2000 to form the new state of Jharkhand); they 
had no desire to increase the numbers of tribals in the state, 
presumably for political reasons. According to Srinivasan and 
Ranjan, 
The Tharu of Champaran lost their bargaining 
power vis-à-vis the state on two counts: (i) they 
were ‘tribals’ but isolated in the wrong part of the 
state—northwest, whereas it is the south which 
has today won full statehood for themselves, 
on the basis of an autonomous tribal identity, 
and (ii) They were BC but in a state where it 
was eventually the Backwards such as the Yadav, 
Koeri and Kurmi, commercially wealthier and 
better integrated with the upper caste society, 
who would gain power (2003: 212).
The status of the Tharu as a Backward Class meant that 
they were effectively marginalized in the politics of Bihar. First 
of all, they were unable to benefit from programs directed at 
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes; they lost out again 
in the political decentralization that took place with the 
implementation of panchayati raj, when special provisions 
were made for the political representation of the Scheduled 
Castes and Scheduled Tribes, for Backward Classes received 
no special consideration. Nor were the Tharus, who were 
politically marginalized and largely illiterate, able to compete 
with more powerful, better organized and more numerous 
Backward Class groups such as the Yadavs for the benefits 
that were available to the Backward Classes. 
The Tharu began an organized effort to change their status 
in 1973, because as Srinivasan and Ranjan note, “The educated 
youth wanted this for jobs, the uneducated for financial 
sanskritization), they did not necessarily encourage the 
formation of pan-ethnic identities of the sort that took place 
among the Tharu in Nepal (see Guneratne 2002).  
During the British period, so-called tribal areas were given 
a special status as “Scheduled Tracts” (Srinivasan & Ranjan 
2003: 204). According to these authors, while one reason for 
such special status—which exempted these areas from the 
normal regulations—was the need to prevent tribal revolts, 
such as had occurred in Bihar at various times during the 
nineteenth century, it was also recognition of the particular 
value of the forest and its produce. The forest provisions of 
the British appear to have carried over to independent India 
because we hear from R.C. Sharma, the author of some 
monographs on Tharu villages that were part of the 1961 
census that outsiders could not settle in the Rana Tharu 
village of Bankati without the permission of the Divisional 
Forest Officer, and that villagers were subject to his order. 
Sharma adds that the Forest Department allowed forest 
villages such as this within their jurisdiction “solely to 
afford a permanent supply of suitable local labour” (Sharma, 
1965:17). In addition, the Tharu living under the jurisdiction 
of the Forest Department were apparently prohibited from 
seeking outside employment under the terms of the settlement 
that allowed them to live in these forest villages. Sharma’s 
account suggests that local officials of the Forest Department 
exercised a great deal of power over the lives of the Tharu 
under their jurisdiction. The Forest Department dealt with 
Tharu villagers through the Tharu pradhan, who was also 
responsible for collecting the revenue and delivering it to the 
Forest office. That Tharu relations with the Forest Department 
were often contentious is indicated by one of the aims of 
the local Tharu Association, which was to safeguard Tharus 
“from harassment by the officials of the Forest Department” 
(Sharma 1965: 35).2 Forest Officers would sometimes remove 
Tharu pradhans from their posts, an action that would invite 
the intervention of the Tharu Association to redress. Even 
so, Sharma characterizes the Tharu of this forest village as 
docile, illiterate people lacking “any political consciousness” 
(Sharma, 1965: 36); even the President and the Secretary of 
the Tharu Association, he notes, were non-Tharu.
I have argued elsewhere (Guneratne 2002) that an 
important factor for the different approaches taken by the 
Tharu in Nepal and India to the question of their unity as 
an ethnic category was that they inhabited two different 
states, which structured in different ways their relations with 
ethnic groups within their boundaries. Furthermore, in India, 
the Tharu fell within two different political jurisdictions, 
the states of Uttar Pradesh and Bihar. Recent work by two 
Indian anthropologists, Amrit Srinivasan and Akhilesh 
Ranjan, enable me to fill out the details of that argument, 
with particular reference to the struggles of the Tharu of 
2. This contentiousness continues today, as described in a recent news 
report in the Hindustan Times, which refers to over 200 cases being filed 
against Tharu villagers living in the Valmikinagar Tiger Sanctuary’s buffer 
zone in Bihar for various infringements of the Forest Act (Verma 2010).
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support from the state agency and the rich Tharus for more 
legal/financial benefits based on state assistance” (2003: 214). 
The state government eventually submitted the claims of the 
Tharu to Scheduled Tribe status to the Union government in 
1996, and final approval, as I have noted above, did not arrive 
until 2003. By that time, with the inclusion of most of Bihar’s 
tribal population in the new state of Jharkhand, the Tharu 
as a tribal category represented only a small and marginal 
minority with little impact on state politics. According to 
the Hunger Free Bihar Campaign, following on the partition 
of Bihar, the State government has no data on the current 
extent of its tribal population and lacks a tribal commission, 
making it virtually impossible for Tharu and other tribals 
(Gond and Santhal) to benefit from the Centre’s programs for 
tribals (Banerjee 2009). As happened in Nepal, the poverty of 
their communities and the exploitation and marginalization 
to which they are subject, have attracted many Tharu in Bihar 
to the ranks of India’s Maoists (Jha 2010).
The status of Scheduled Tribe, with its attendant benefits 
and linked to the fact of the minuscule numbers of Tharu 
in the populations of Uttar Pradesh and Bihar means that 
pan-Tharu ethnic unity is politically less salient in India than 
it is in Nepal. Thus, while the trend in Nepal has been to 
ethnic consolidation of the various Tharu groups, in India 
this has not occurred. The two main concentrations of Tharu 
population, in Champaran and Naini Tal, have maintained 
separate ethnic organizations or caste associations. India’s 
approach to state building allows for cultural difference 
(given the size and complexity of India, and its democratic 
politics, it has little alternative) while also allowing for the 
more privileged and fortunate members of marginalized 
communities opportunities for advancement. In Nepal, in 
contrast, not only was cultural difference not recognized, 
the state refused to create avenues to proactively integrate 
into national public life historically marginalized groups and 
provide them avenues for advancement within the structures 
of the state. Although this is beginning to change under the 
pressure of the various ethnically based political movements 
that have emerged since 1990, and especially in the aftermath 
of the Maoist insurgency, the face of the state in Nepal does 
not truly reflect the cultural complexity of its population.
THE THARU AND THE STATE IN NEPAL
The Tharu enjoyed a great deal of autonomy with the 
various states and principalities that existed in the hills prior 
to the unification of Nepal. Our insight into the nature of 
these relations owes a great deal to the lal mohar (royal 
edicts) collected by the Tharu historian Tej Narayan Panjiar, 
and published with commentaries (Krauskopff and Meyer 
2000). What these documents, some of which date back three 
hundred years, show is the reliance that the hill states placed 
on local Tharu elites to manage the affairs of Tarai lands to 
yield revenue to the state, and the great degree of autonomy 
the Tharus appear to have enjoyed in their affairs. As revenue 
collectors for the hill states, Tharu elites enjoyed the political 
support of their masters, but were apparently left to manage 
other aspects of their affairs more or less on their own terms. 
There was relatively less impact on Tharu societies from 
outside groups for a number of reasons. Observers in the 
colonial period have remarked on the tendency of the Tharu 
to retreat in the face of competition from other, perhaps 
better-organized and more powerful ethnic groups. The Tarai 
was a last refuge, whose malarial properties discouraged 
other settlers from moving into the area. In addition, certain 
qualities were attributed to the Tharu by their neighbors, a 
fact remarked on by British writers. The British missionary 
Knowles for instance noted that Tharu women of post-
marriageable age were believed by outsiders to be witches, 
with the power to turn a desi or a stranger into a wild animal 
or destroy him slowly by fever. Tharuhat, he adds, is a 
synonym for witch land (in Crooke 1896: 405). Fear of the 
Tharu and fear of malaria kept outsiders at bay in many areas 
of the Tarai, including Chitwan and the Naya Muluk, until the 
malaria eradication program of the 1950s made Tarai lands 
available to hill people for settlement. In the less malarial 
Eastern Tarai however, there was an influx of people from 
across the border, encouraged by the state, looking for land; 
in these areas the Tharu appeared to have played the role of a 
dominant, land-controlling caste.
The unification of Nepal led to a general erosion of the 
autonomy that the Tharu elites had enjoyed in the conduct of 
their affairs in the Tarai, as the state now sought to rationalize 
the revenue collecting system. The Tharu jimidars became 
agents of the state in a much more defined and centralized 
bureaucratic hierarchy, a process that accelerated during the 
Rana period, until, in the post-Rana period, they were made 
redundant with the institution of a modern bureaucratic 
apparatus. The Tharu elite went from being “little kings” to 
servants of the state and then to being quite marginal to the 
state’s administration of the Tarai.
The modern state
The radical transformation in the fortunes of the Tharu 
begins in the 1950s. While the period of state consolidation 
during the nineteenth century had seen erosion in the 
autonomy of their position, Tharu communities in the Tarai 
had had the access to resources they needed for their social and 
cultural reproduction. The malaria eradication program set 
in motion a process that brought various Tharu communities 
into conflict with other ethnic groups as well as into contact 
with each other and with the new values of modernization 
and national integration as Nepalis enjoying—on paper at 
least—the same rights as all other Nepalis. It is not that these 
transformations had the same effect on all Tharus equally; 
rather, what is significant is their impact on Tharu elites.
The most important change of course was in the nature 
of the polity, which shifted from emphasizing the cultural 
difference and fundamental inequality that characterizes the 
subjects of the state and was the basis on which they were to 
be ruled, to an emphasis on their cultural similarity (“national 
tHaru-state relations/guneratne
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the Tarai. The opening of the Tarai brought in two significant 
forms of development that shaped the relationship of the Tharu 
to the state. The first of these was the establishment of a road 
network connecting the eastern and the western Tarai and the 
Tarai region to the hills. These roads facilitated the movement 
of hill people into the Tarai, but they also made it easier for 
Tharu in different districts to establish contact and interact 
with one another in ways they could not have contemplated 
earlier. This was further facilitated by the second important 
infrastructural innovation: the establishment of schools and 
the creation of a national curriculum based on the teaching of 
the Nepali language and an interpretation of Nepali history, 
culture and society based on the experience of the high caste 
pahari groups that dominate the Nepali state. Roads and 
schools gave the Tharu elite opportunities to engage one 
another but also a language—Nepali—through which such 
communication could be carried out. These schools became 
a crucible in which a new ethnic consciousness began to take 
shape.
The third transformation contributing to the delineating 
of a Tharu identity was the socializing of the Tharu elite 
into high caste cultural norms. For instance, the kanyadan 
became the normative marriage ceremony, which facilitated 
marriage across the boundaries of the different Tharu jat. 
In other words, through the process of Nepalization, the 
Tharu elite came to share cultural practices that facilitated 
the establishment of relations among them and made 
possible the emergence of a common Tharu identity. As I 
have argued elsewhere (Guneratne 2002), one of the bases 
of Tharu ethnic identity formation was the forging of kinship 
links among the families of elite Tharu drawn from every 
corner of the Tarai, which had not existed earlier. Prior to 
the malaria eradication program, different groups of Tharu, 
even those living in adjacent areas, had regarded each other as 
belonging to different jat, and intermarriage was prohibited. 
Now, not only have these prohibitions fallen by the wayside 
with the emergence of a Tharu ethnic consciousness, but the 
socializing of the elite into the national culture also gives 
them a shared cultural idiom through which to communicate. 
Thus, infrastructural changes have themselves helped to 
shape a new symbolic framework in which people act and 
give meaning to their world. The problem of intermarriage 
in the absence of such a shared cultural idiom is succinctly 
summed up in the words of a Tharu from Chitwan (note that 
“language” here is also a metonym for culture in general):
It’s better to marry within your district. 
Chaudharys of other districts speak somewhat 
differently. So one would need to make some 
changes in the way one speaks. This will be 
a little difficult for one’s daughter. But if you 
marry her off within your own district, there is 
no language problem.
The malaria eradication program brought large numbers 
of hill people to settle in the Tarai, turning the Tharu who had 
integration”) and their right to equal treatment. Thus the 1962 
constitution of Nepal declares that all citizens have the right 
to equal protection of the laws, and asserts that there shall 
be no discrimination on grounds of religion, race, sex, caste, 
or tribe in application of the general laws and in respect of 
appointment to public service (Agrawal, 1980). This of course 
is the complete reverse of the legal principles enshrined in the 
muluki ain of 1854. These ideals are reaffirmed in the 1990 
constitution:
it is expedient to promulgate and enforce this 
Constitution . . . by promoting amongst the 
people of Nepal the spirit of fraternity and the 
bond of unity on the basis of liberty and equality 
(Constitution of the Kingdom of Nepal, 1991: 
19)
The point is not that these admirable ideas were 
implemented, for by and large they were not; what is important 
is their impact on the consciousness of the rapidly emerging 
educated and middle classes in Nepal, including significant 
numbers of Tharu throughout the Tarai, and especially in the 
eastern districts. This is well exemplified in the position taken 
by elites in the Tharu Kalyankarini Sabha to the census of 
1991. There, equipped with an acute understanding of the 
significance of labels and their enumeration, they organized 
to ensure that their ethnic brethren in villages across the Tarai 
identified themselves as “Tharu” to the census enumerators. 
The implication of this action is that the political significance 
of the concept “Tharu” was less evident to the ordinary Tharu, 
who had to be mobilized to give the politically necessary 
response. If the numbers in that census are anything to go by, 
this campaign had a very positive outcome.
The other changes that took place were the social, political, 
and economic transformation of the Tarai, which was made 
possible by the Malaria Eradication Project of the 1950s. 
There is no denying that the Malaria Eradication Project was a 
positive, desirable and necessary step in the development and 
political evolution of Nepal. Like all development projects 
however, the redistribution of land that took place as a result 
of it created both beneficiaries and victims, and many of 
those victims were people who had been living in these areas 
before the malaria eradication project was implemented. The 
impact on the Tharu was two fold. First, it closed off the land 
frontier and brought to an end the mobility of Tharu society, 
which derived from different kinds of tenurial systems and 
adjustments to the burden of taxation (see Guneratne 1996). 
Second, many Tharu lost land to better organized, literate 
and sometimes-unscrupulous immigrants from the hills, who 
acquired land cultivated by the Tharu in ways both legal and 
illegal (Guneratne 2002). Tharus throughout the Tarai but 
especially in the west came to share a common experience in 
respect of hill immigrants, in which high castes from the hills 
were blamed for the misfortunes that had overtaken Tharu 
society. 
The second transformation concerns the development of 
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lived there before they arrived into disadvantaged minorities. 
The relations between Tharu and hill settlers appear to 
differ qualitatively from the relations between Tharu and 
immigrants into the Tarai from the border districts of India 
in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In the latter 
case, although these relations have not, to my knowledge, 
been studied in any detail, there is some evidence to suggest 
that the Tharu often occupied a position of power vis-à-vis 
the newcomers. The Tharu, or at least their elites, served 
the hill states as revenue functionaries, and thus were in a 
position of authority from the outset, a fact indicated in the 
Panjiar documents (Krauskopff and Meyer 2000) and the 
recollections of Ramanand Singh (Guneratne 2002: 35). 
The position however was very different with regard to the 
hill immigrants in the post-Rana state. The impact of this 
immigration was most strongly felt in the western half of the 
Tarai, especially in the Far West and in the Inner Tarai valleys, 
and here the Tharu were almost invariably on the losing side. 
At worst, they lost land and ended up as bonded labor; at 
best, local elites became junior partners in political processes 
dominated by high-caste immigrants. 
Chitwan exemplifies a situation where the immigration of 
hill people have reduced the Tharu to a small minority, led 
to the loss of Tharu land—but without the extreme effects, 
such as kamaiya labor, found in the western Tarai—and 
made Tharus the junior partners in the political affairs of 
every major political party. One major difference between 
Chitwan and some of the districts to the west is that although 
many Tharus have lost land in the aftermath of the malaria 
eradication program, the district lacks the landlords and large 
estates dominated by high castes that characterize the western 
Tarai districts. Relations between Tharus and Brahmans in 
Chitwan are less imbued with the tension and hostility that 
I noticed in Dang in the early 1990s, and this is probably 
due to the absence of a system of bonded labor delineated 
along ethnic lines, the presence of large (by local standards) 
Tharu landowners in almost every village in the heavily 
Tharu-populated eastern part of the district, and the fact that 
most households control some land, however inadequate. 
The peculiar circumstances of Chitwan during Rana times—
first, its position as a buffer between Nepal and the British, 
and subsequently its status as a hunting preserve for the 
Ranas—meant that there was no significant proportion of its 
land under birta tenure. While there does not appear to be 
much social interaction among ordinary Brahman and Tharu 
villagers, each group keeping more or less to itself, there is a 
great deal more among the elites, who may have political ties 
by working together in the same political parties and who 
invite each other to ritual occasions and life cycle rites.
Even the elite, however, which has the closest ties—
personal, ritual, and political—to Brahmin society, views it 
with reserve. It is the Brahmin qua Brahmin who is singled 
out for opprobrium, Chhetris and Newars somewhat less so 
(although Chhetri tends to be a category lumped together 
with Brahmin as one undifferentiated whole). Gurungs, 
Magars, Tamangs and Tarai ethnic groups are not marked 
in rural Chitwan in the way the first three mentioned ethnic 
groups are. It is at the hands of Brahmins, and to a lesser 
extent, of Chhetris and Newars, that Tharus have lost land 
and have felt themselves to be cheated and exploited. This 
has been a cause of resentment among Tharus throughout 
the Tarai, wherever they have been brought into contact with 
large numbers of hill settlers.
These factors have led many Tharus to interpret 
their experiences in a particular way. The state policies 
referred to above—malaria eradication, the development 
of communications, the creation of a national system of 
education, the incorporation of peripheral regions into a 
national economy which in turn is tightly integrated into the 
regional and ultimately the global economy, and the creation 
of a modern bureaucracy (modern in its form, although not 
necessarily in the value system of its cadre)—is part and 
parcel of contemporary state building. The political buzzword 
in Nepal in the panchayat era was national integration and 
certain kinds of integration—economic and administrative—
did in fact take place. But, as the case of the Tharu indicates, 
the creation of a national identity proved to be a much 
more complex task. It is clear that from the perspective of 
the government, national integration meant the subsuming 
of ethnic particularities in a greater, “Nepali” whole. But the 
practice of the state (or of its agents) served more to remind 
those groups not at the center of power of their marginality 
and otherness and thus reinforce an emerging sense of the 
importance of ethnic distinctiveness. 
Two things should be remembered here. The first is 
that the official ideology and rhetoric of the modernizing 
state promises one thing even as it delivers another. What 
it promises, through documents such as the constitution, 
through public rhetoric but also through such rituals as the 
vote, is the putative political equality of all Nepal’s people. 
But what is more important are not these promises but the 
impact of these ideas on the leaders and intellectuals of the 
various communities. For most of Nepal’s impoverished 
villagers, engaged in the daily hardscrabble of existence, these 
promises may not have meant much, but they had a much 
greater impact on the thinking of those with some education 
who, in the absence of a private sector of any importance, 
looked to the state for advancement. But for many of them 
such advancement was not forthcoming; playing by the 
rules—passing the SLC, going to college—did not lead 
to employment in the state sector, in which the game of 
patronage politics is played out, and this was interpreted by 
many Tharu as discrimination against them. 
The kamaiya problem and the Maoist insurgency
Given the fundamental historical inequality among the 
different ethnic groups of Nepal, which was grounded in 
and structured by the law of the state until 1963, one cannot 
treat as equal people who are not in fact equal.  Structural 
inequality cannot be eliminated by simple fiat; the structure 
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CPN-M insurgency and ongoing Tharu and land 
rights movements became blurred for many 
high-caste landowners. The Tharu population 
was increasingly associated with the CPN-M 
and the view that “all Tharus are Maoists” 
became common among the landowning class. 
Furthermore, through the links of kinship and 
caste between these landowners and members 
of the high-caste groups of hill origin that 
dominated State institutions, this became the 
prevailing mentality of local authorities and 
security forces alike. In this context, members 
of the Tharu and other marginalised groups 
claiming their rights vis a vis landowners or 
State authorities were at increasing risk of being 
labeled as Maoists and insurgents (UN-OHCHR 
2008: 19-20).
Many Tharu in the western districts were recruited by the 
Maoists (and some of them were very likely liberated kamaiya 
left destitute to their own devices). Many others, like ordinary 
villagers throughout Nepal during this period, were coerced 
into helping them, but the military and police came to see all 
Tharu as Maoists and carried out a campaign of repression, 
rape, torture and extra judicial killings against the Tharu 
population. The most intense period of violence was during 
2002. According to the UN, Tharu accounted “for over 
85% (135) of the persons disappeared by State authorities 
in cases documented by OHCHR” (UN-OHCHR 2008: 6). 
Tharu organizations and leaders were also targeted by the 
Maoists, who saw in Backward Society Education (BASE) 
a serious rival which could claim the loyalty of most of the 
Tharu population of the Western Tarai districts and which 
was effectively organized on the ground. A number of Tharu 
leaders were assassinated and on a number of occasions, 
Maoists destroyed BASE infrastructure, including the BASE 
training center in Chakhaura village in Dang, one of the 
original villages in which BASE began. 
The militancy demonstrated by the Tharu and the 
expansion of their Tarai-wide organizing, most recently in 
the establishment of a federation of Tharu NGOs (Tharu 
Indigenous NGO federation, with Dilli Chaudhary of BASE 
as its general secretary) has its roots in this intense experience 
of violence. But it must be noted that the Tharu have 
demonstrated over the years an ability to organize nationally 
right down to the village level, first in the organization of the 
Tharu Kalyankarini Sabha, and then, more effectively perhaps 
in terms of mobilizing popular support, in the organization of 
BASE in the five western Tarai districts. The accommodationist 
approach of the Tharu Kalyankarini Sabha towards the state 
has been replaced by a much more confrontationalist and 
militant approach by the Tharu leadership (of which BASE 
and the Sabha are but two, albeit important, components), 
exemplified in the bandhs of 2009 against the Maoist 
government’s attempt to categorize the Tharu as Madhesi. 
The new politics of the Tharu, inspired by the provisions of 
the International Labor Organization’s convention 169 on the 
itself must be disassembled and the relations among the 
various components of society reconstituted.  In a primarily 
agrarian society, this would require a comprehensive agrarian 
reform, which Nepal has hitherto avoided. This problem is 
highlighted in the state’s response to the kamaiya problem, 
arguably one of the most salient issues for western Tharu in 
the 1990s, which exemplified this structural inequality in an 
extreme form. A significant proportion of Tharu labor in the 
western Tarai was bonded to the service of mostly high-caste 
landlords (although some Tharu landlords also use bonded 
labor), a state of affairs that developed in the post-Rana 
period with origins in pre-existing systems of labor relations 
(Guneratne 2002: 96-107; Krauskopff 2008: 216-228; Rankin 
1999). Bonded labor is not of course confined to either the 
Tharu or the Western Tarai, but it is among the Tharu and in 
the Western Tarai that the movement to eliminate this form of 
labor exploitation received its strongest expression. 
That it became a salient issue was due to the initiative 
of young men from Dang, who founded the NGO known as 
Backward Society Education (BASE) and struggled for many 
years, often at great personal risk to themselves, to bring 
the system to an end (Guneratne 2002; Krauskopff 2008). 
Their struggle was not simply against the existing structures 
of power in rural western Nepal, but against bureaucratic 
indifference and the hostility of the state apparatus. Despite 
the presence of Tharu landlords who controlled kamaiya, the 
kamaiya issue was understood by Tharu activists in Dang in 
the early 1990s as a problem that Tharus had with high caste 
immigrants from the hills. A class issue had taken on a distinct 
ethnic tinge, and the government’s lack of interest in the issue 
could only be understood as support for landlords, many of 
whom were important local members of national political 
parties or local employees of the state bureaucracy. While the 
government’s hand on the kamaiya issue was eventually forced 
by NGO activists and mass demonstrations, the state gave in 
with poor grace, and took no steps to provide either land or 
livelihood to the kamaiya following their emancipation. One 
commentator describes the process of kamaiya emancipation 
as “haphazard, inhuman and careless” (Chhetri 2005:41).
One last factor shaping Tharu identity in the present—
at least as far as the Western Tarai is concerned—must be 
mentioned. That is the Maoist Insurgency or People’s War 
(1996-2006), which took the lives of 1200 Tharu in Bardiya,3 
and hundreds more in other Tarai districts. If the estimate of 
14,000 dead in the decade-long conflict is accurate, the Tharu 
as an ethnic group bore a disproportionately high share of the 
human cost of the war—perhaps ten percent of the fatalities. 
According to the UN-OHCHR, 
Local people and Tharu and non-Tharu civil 
society representatives repeatedly stated to 
OHCHR that the distinction between the 
3. See United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human 
Rights (UN-OHCHR) (2008), for documentation of atrocities committed on 
Tharu in Bardiya district.
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rights of indigenous people, seeks a federal province of their 
own, proportional representation in every sphere of the state 
based on caste/ethnicity in which the Tharu will be treated as 
a separate ethnic group and not subsumed under a broader 
category such as madhesi or janajati, the appointment of 
Tharu to major state offices in the area of Tharuhat (which 
is coterminous with the Tarai) and the rehabilitation of 
the kamaiyas.  These are the main demands of the newly 
established Tharu Indigenous NGO Federation.4
CONCLUSION
The official culture of the Nepali state until quite recently 
was based, as I pointed out earlier, on the culture of the 
dominant ethnic groups. In some respects, this was inevitable; 
it is the language (or dialect) and culture of the elites in 
society that achieve prestige and status, and, where the state 
is concerned, becomes the basis around which national 
identities are usually organized. For Nepal, it was also one 
of the most politically effective ways to mark the country’s 
autonomous identity vis-à-vis India.  Thus, the culture and 
religion of the dominant ethnic groups was congruent with 
that officially espoused and promoted by the state. The 
domination of Nepali society by high castes thus had three 
bases of support: the economic, political and cultural, each 
reinforcing the others. In pre-modern Nepal, this fact was of 
less consequence politically; there was no proactive attempt 
on the part of the state to shape a common culture or national 
identity. 
It is probably uncontroversial to argue that there was 
no official national culture as such in the Rana state and its 
predecessors, even though the cultural assumptions of the elites 
who controlled the state informed their approach to matters 
of governance. Jang Bahadur’s muluki ain is very much of an 
elite document elucidating an elite point of view, but its point 
was to emphasize the difference between rulers and ruled, to 
stress the various things that the different components of the 
Nepali population did not share.  State-building in modern 
Nepal however is predicated on the assumption that a state 
must have a national culture and a national identity, and this 
is pursued through both formal legislative enactments—such 
as the legal status of Nepal as a Hindu state, in force until 
2006—and through more indirect means, such as a national 
system of education in which instruction is carried out in 
the national language and through which a national ideology 
can be imparted. The state’s project had been, to paraphrase 
Eugen Weber, to turn peasants into Nepalis, but without 
much commitment to liberty, equality or fraternity. The 
difference between the Rana state and its successor was that 
for the first, the organization of the population and its relation 
to the state was predicated on the fact of cultural difference, 
which was stressed; for its successor, this relationship was 
based on a wish for cultural similarity on the state’s terms 
and the rejection of those politically salient aspects of cultural 
4. See the Federation’s website at http://www.tharufed.org.np
difference, such as ethnicity and language.
And yet modern Nepal’s attempts to create a national 
identity around the symbols meaningful to those elites at the 
center of national power have not borne much fruit, as political 
events in Nepal over the last dozen years or so demonstrate. 
The rise of both the janajati and madhesi movement and the 
Maoist insurgency, as well as social movements to press for 
Dalit demands, speaks to a profound alienation from both the 
structure and the symbols of the Nepali state. Dev Raj Dahal 
has commented that “the movements of ethnic groups and 
nationalities tend to challenge the self-referential rationality 
of the unitary Hindu state and argue for its federalization 
and secularization” and he quotes Mario Diani to this effect: 
“What is challenged is not only the uneven distribution of 
power and/or economic goods, but socially shared meanings 
as well, that is the ways of defining and interpreting reality” 
(Dahal, n.d.; Diani 2000: 163). The removal of the heavy 
handed repression of ethnic identities that occurred during 
the panchayat period has led to the efflorescence of the 
politicized ethnic identities that were waiting in the wings for 
their moment on the national stage, and the case of the Tharu, 
who have the oldest registered ethnic association in Nepal, is 
a good example of this. 
Nepal failed in the post-Rana period to come to terms with 
its feudal history and its history of fundamental inequality 
among ethnic groups and transform those conditions in 
democratic ways. Consequently, it seems they are likely to 
be transformed in undemocratic ways, and one sort of ethnic 
repression might well be replaced by another. The ugly 
underside of ethnic federalism is ethnic cleansing, and there 
are reports that this is already happening in some parts of 
the Tarai—although the Tharu are not involved (see Miklian 
2008: 8; Tiwari 2007). The Rana state and the states that 
preceded it acknowledged and legitimized the reality of status 
inequality among ethnic groups; that, it might be argued, was a 
fundamental aspect of their purpose. The Rana state enshrined 
that inequality in the legal code of 1854, and the post-Rana 
state, in an admirable acknowledgement of democratic ideas, 
abolished formal recognition of it. In panchayat Nepal, 
dependent both on the ideology of modernization and on the 
fiscal support of the outside world, it was necessary that all 
ethnic groups should be granted formal equality, whatever the 
social reality. The failure to make that promise meaningful 
accounts in large part for the current state of affairs, and 
certainly for the resonance of ethnic issues in what would 
otherwise be a class struggle.  Krauskopff has pointed out 
that the purely class (or economic) aspects have been pushed 
aside by ethnic demands (Krauskopff 2008: 241).  That 
ethnicity is bound up with class is a fact of Nepali life that the 
CPN-Maoist has been able to successfully exploit in its quest 
for power, but whether it can control or channel the ethnic 
demands it has helped to unleash is another matter altogether. 
Events in the Tarai of the last four years suggest that it cannot. 
Contrary to the views of that highly placed Nepali official over 
twenty years ago, the Tharu (and the Madhesi) are Nepali and 
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not Indian, but they seek to be Nepali on their own terms, not 
those historically imposed on them by the state.  
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